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The implications of Brexit for the 
future of Europe
Michelle Cini and Amy Verdun
Introduction
The result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership came as a shock 
not only to UK elites, but also to the rest of the EU. The outcome hit the 
EU, its Member States and its institutions, hard for many reasons – but 
perhaps for three in particular. First, it was the first time (barring the 
exceptional cases of Greenland and Algeria, for which see Kiran Klaus 
Patel’s Chapter 12 in this volume) that the EU would diminish in size. 
Second, EU actors recognised that the political implications of the UK’s 
decision would reverberate across their domestic political arenas. Third, 
the outcome was extremely puzzling. Few could figure out exactly why 
UK voters wished to leave, why the UK government would accept the 
decision when there was such a slim majority in favour of leaving, why the 
popular support was against what most experts and leading politicians 
advocated for, and what the UK would put in its place. Furthermore, the 
referendum results varied significantly across the UK, suggesting that 
any new relationship the UK might end up having with the EU (what 
became known as a ‘soft’ or a ‘hard’ British exit from the EU) could alter 
the UK’s constitutional settlement. Despite numerous concerns about 
how the UK and the EU would sort through the many issues involved 
in only two years, Prime Minister Theresa May invoked Article 50 on 29 
March 2017 by notifying the EU Council President Donald Tusk of the 
UK’s intention to leave the EU (HM Government 2017b).
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While the domestic debate on Brexit has mainly focused on the 
implications for the UK, it is important to reflect on the possible impli-
cations of Brexit for European integration more generally. The chal-
lenge comes from the fact that Brexit is not ‘the only game in town’, but 
rather one of several ‘crises’ that have been ailing the EU, and which 
will also affect European integration (Cini & Pérez- Solórzano 2016; 
Nugent, Chapter 5 in this volume). As such, Brexit has to be considered 
as part of a broader package of uncertainties determining the direction 
of travel for the EU. On that basis, we view successive EU crises (e.g. 
the eurozone crisis, the migration crisis, and the crisis associated with 
Brexit) as contextual factors that open windows of opportunity and gen-
erate sources of motivation for actors who seek to take advantage of the 
instability and uncertainty that crisis provokes. They do this by pushing 
their own agendas. These agendas, whether or not they deal explicitly 
with European integration, have repercussions for the EU. These reper-
cussions are not so much final outcomes as processes of change: they 
either fragment the EU or make it more cohesive. With that in mind, 
in addressing the possible impact of Brexit on European integration, 
we distil two broad trajectories, the first of which leads to the fragmen-
tation and weakening of the EU (the centrifugal trajectory); and the 
second, which leads to greater EU cooperation, and the strengthening 
of the European integration process (the centripetal trajectory).
The UK: an influential EU Member State
The premise on which the argument rests is that the UK has been, until 
now, an influential member of the EU. Ever since joining, in 1973, 
what was then the European Communities, the UK, as one of the larger 
Member States, has more than most helped to shape European integra-
tion. It has done so in two ways: first, by constraining EU initiatives; and 
second, by supporting and promoting EU initiatives.
In its constraining role, the UK often sought to veto or limit EU 
initiatives. An example of such behaviour can be found in the negotia-
tions on the Maastricht Treaty. These negotiations led to the creation of 
the EU with its important new policy of EMU and its Social Chapter. The 
UK managed to restrict integration in these areas and eventually negoti-
ated special arrangements for itself in both cases (but only having first 
made sure they were restricted in their scope and not overly ‘federal’) 
(Verdun 2000). More recently, the UK exerted its veto against the reform 
of the Lisbon Treaty. Other Member States were keen to strengthen the 
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rules on budgetary and fiscal governance, in the light of the eurozone 
crisis, so as to firm up the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). As there was 
no unanimous agreement on the matter, the other Member States signed 
the Treaty on Stability, Cooperation and Governance (often known as the 
‘Fiscal Compact’) as an intergovernmental treaty in 2012, which subse-
quently came into effect in 2013.
The UK has not always been successful in its attempts to limit EU 
initiatives, however. As UK Prime Minister Thatcher discovered in the 
early 1980s, for example, the national veto, preventing the operation 
of qualified majority voting, was already something of a chimera. To 
this day, more often than not, the Council takes decisions by consensus. 
On those occasions when the Council actually votes, in the vast major-
ity of cases the UK votes with the majority. Having said that, recent 
research by Simon Hix and Sara Hagemann suggests that this situation 
has recently changed. Their research on formal voting outcomes shows 
that although the UK failed to vote the same way as the winning vote in 
only 2.6 per cent of the cases in the period 2004– 9, in the more recent 
period (2009– 15) it was deviating from the winning vote in 12.3 per cent 
of cases (Hix & Hagemann 2015).
Second, in its supportive role, the UK itself promoted various 
initiatives, from the introduction of regional and cohesion policy in 
the 1970s, to the relaunch of the internal/ Single Market in the 1980s, 
and even, though it ultimately never became a full member, the design 
of the architecture for EMU and Justice and Home Affairs. It also was 
often an advocate of ‘widening’ over ‘deepening’, that is, in favour of 
expanding the EU, so as to include new Member States, rather than 
supportive of deeper integration in the areas in which the EU was 
already involved. Its policy influence is perhaps most clearly identi-
fied in the UK’s shaping of Enlargement Policy and in its impact on 
Common Security and Defence Policy, where the UK became a core EU 
player – not least because of the size of its armed forces and defence 
sector.
Successive UK governments have thus been fairly successful 
in shaping EU initiatives in line with what they conceive to be in the 
national interest. Of course, there are many instances where ‘red lines’ 
were crossed and compromises agreed  – even if they were not always 
presented as such back home. Standing back from the specifics, the UK’s 
influence has promoted, first, a particular form of European integration, 
and second, a particular ideological agenda. In the case of the former, 
UK governments have tended, more than other governments, to favour 
intergovernmental solutions to institutional reform. The instigation of 
This content downloaded from 132.229.250.72 on Mon, 04 Feb 2019 14:00:13 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
BrExit  And BEyond66
  
the pillar system at Maastricht, which failed to integrate internal affairs 
and foreign policy into the EU’s supranational ‘European Community’ pil-
lar, is a notable case in point. With regards to the latter point, UK govern-
ments have advocated a more liberal economic agenda within the EU, 
irrespective of the party in power.
The impact of Brexit
Based on the premise that the UK has been an influential Member State 
of the EU, what then might be the implications of UK withdrawal for 
European integration? While the two perspectives – a centrifugal and a 
centripetal one – oversimplify the options available, and do not cover all 
potential implications, they do serve as a useful heuristic device in high-
lighting the ways in which Brexit might be used by different actors to 
advance their own political agendas on the future of Europe.
the centrifugal trajectory
Arguably, the EU has never been more fragmented than it is today. 
Divisions over policy preferences have become bitter. European solidarity 
has been undermined as a consequence of both long- term problems and 
more recent crises. Growing distrust of European elites has been exploited 
by nativist groups and parties, often allied with anti- immigration senti-
ment, to propose populist solutions to Europe’s problems. Euroscepticism 
has sometimes driven these agendas, though on other occasions it has 
simply become a supplementary agenda. Important substantive policy 
differences often lie at the source of these divisions. The political cleav-
age that opened up during the eurozone crisis, based on an economic 
split between creditor states, such as Germany, and debtor states, such 
as Greece, saw the countries directly involved in the crisis take opposite 
sides in a bitter blame- game. A  similar phenomenon was witnessed at 
the height of the migrant crisis, where the absence of effective burden- 
sharing exacerbated already fragile relations between North and South, 
and between East and West. The citizens and governments of numerous 
Member States began to disengage from European integration, turning in 
on themselves. Collective institutions, such as the border- free Schengen 
system, were suspended, ostensibly for a limited time, but flagging up the 
possibility of total collapse. While policy differences may be resolved – 
once solutions are found and the crisis passed – the more fundamental 
differences that shape them, differences in assumptions about social 
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and economic liberalism, whether from the left or the right, seem more 
intractable.
Where does Brexit and the UK fit into this analysis of the EU? It 
is paradoxical that the UK was always on the outside of these issues. 
It looked on while the crises were in full flow. But these high- profile 
crises hide the fact that where the more pro- European governments of 
the EU, perhaps supported by a Franco- German vanguard, would be 
inclined to seek deepened integration (as in areas such as fiscal policy, 
police cooperation, and immigration and border control), the UK was 
typically the voice providing opposition and scepticism, and advocat-
ing greater caution. Although there were occasions when the UK was in 
a minority of one, it was often speaking out loud the private thoughts 
of other Member States. Where Central and Eastern European govern-
ments were reluctant to appear anti- European, they were often content 
with the UK’s more subdued vision of integration. With this voice gone, 
others will have to take over this role, and their vision will be a differ-
ent one than the liberal- market- oriented, Atlanticist view that the UK 
typically represented. These other states, moreover, do not have the 
same political clout that the UK managed to conjure up – the product 
of its seniority in the EU, its democratic track- record, the size of its 
economy and population, and its long experience in diplomacy and for-
eign affairs. Nor do they necessarily possess the skills of UK statesmen 
and diplomats, or hold the natural advantage of being native speakers 
of the English language. This could mean that calls for less integration 
will have weaker backers. Or, given that even without Brexit, Central 
and Eastern European states, such as Hungary and Poland, have become 
more vocal in their resistance to supranational and regulatory EU initia-
tives, it could mean that anti- EU sentiment persists, but in more stat-
ist form, and without a clear articulation that reaches the citizens and 
political leaders of other Member States. Even though many Europeans 
are appalled at the British tabloid press, it has offered a language for 
others elsewhere in the EU to emulate. The national media in Eastern 
Europe do not reach other Europeans as easily.
Likewise, there are numerous political groupings within Member 
States, both parties and more diffuse social movements, which reflect 
popular concern over the deepening of integration in the EU. Without 
the constraints that UK membership represents, those groups may see 
an opportunity for further mobilisation of support, resulting from the 
fear that the EU without the UK could push ahead to integrate further 
in certain areas. The same arguments used to justify a Leave vote in the 
UK referendum could also hold sway in other European states (Cini and 
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Pérez- Solórzano 2016). Anti- immigration, anti- globalisation and anti- 
elite political positions are hardly exclusive to the UK. While Hobolt 
(2016, 1273) argued that there was no evidence of short- term contagion 
effects, in the sense of other Member States planning on holding referen-
dums, she admits that ‘the Brexit vote nonetheless poses a serious chal-
lenge to the political establishment across Europe’ and that such effects 
might thus emerge in the months and years ahead.
the centripetal trajectory
However, without the UK, the EU might be better equipped to move into 
crisis resolution mode. The Brexit negotiations, if handled well, could 
help the process of rebuilding solidarity among the EU27. The German 
government has itself pushed this line (Duff 2017, 1). There is noth-
ing more unifying than having to show a common front. The EU dem-
onstrated this unity early on, during the Bratislava European Council 
meeting of September 2016, and it was also evident in the run- up to 
the agreement of the negotiation mandate in April 2017. Indeed, even 
if relations between the two sides remain relatively cordial, the Member 
States entering into negotiations with the UK will be aware that the 
effectiveness of the EU’s negotiating strategies will be carefully exam-
ined by their own domestic constituencies and that they will need to 
demonstrate their toughness. The argument often made in the weeks 
following the UK referendum, that EU Member States will want to 
ensure the UK does not get too ‘good’ a deal in order to deter Eurosceptic 
forces in other Member States’ domestic constituencies, still carries 
some weight – at least in some quarters. The European Council, led by 
European Council president Donald Tusk and the head of the Brexit 
taskforce of the Council, Didier Seeuws, is especially important when it 
comes to bringing the Member States together, since it is responsible for 
the EU’s common negotiating stance (European Council 2017a).
While solidarity has been sorely lacking among the EU Member 
States in recent years, this has not prevented the emergence of new initia-
tives. The eurozone crisis has already led to new institutional initiatives, 
new legislation, a new treaty, and even new institutional mechanisms to 
deal with the sovereign debt crisis and to prevent further financial melt-
down (Verdun 2015). One can easily argue therefore that one of the con-
sequences of the eurozone crisis has been to open the door to further 
European integration. Brexit may make further steps in this direction 
even more likely. While the UK neither joined EMU, nor prevented the 
introduction of the euro, it has since the early 2000s argued vehemently 
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for recognition that the EU comprises more than one currency. It has 
stressed that the EU’s (read: eurozone’s) policies should not be prejudi-
cial towards Member States using currencies other than the euro. For the 
UK, this position most often took the form of a defence of the interests 
of the City of London, and of a more ‘facilitative and liberal approach 
to financial regulation’ (Moloney 2017). This matter was of such impor-
tance to the UK government after 2010 that it featured as one of the issues 
dealt with in David Cameron’s pre- referendum negotiations. With the UK 
leaving the EU, and the other EMU ‘outs’ much weaker, the stage is set 
for the euro to become, once again, the flagship policy of the EU – and 
perhaps for further post- crisis steps towards a fiscal (or economic) union. 
As Sapir et al. put it: ‘Brexit also involves opportunities for the EU27. It 
may generate momentum towards building more integrated and vibrant 
capital markets that would better serve all its Member States’ economies, 
improve risk sharing to withstand local shocks, and make the Union a 
more attractive place to do global financial business’ (Sapir et al. 2017).
In other policy areas, too, there is some indication of the devel-
opment of a new pro- integration agenda. Indeed, in the second half of 
2016, following the Bratislava European Council in September, France 
and Germany announced that they were considering strengthening 
cooperation on security matters. Some might argue that the expected 
departure of the UK from the Common Security and Defence Policy 
(CSDP) makes little difference, since the UK has been something of a 
half- hearted member since at least 2010, and because the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO) is more important for European defence. 
But from a centripetal perspective, with the UK’s departure, the EU loses 
half of its Franco- British defence axis, which has been at the heart of the 
CSDP. Thus, in order not to weaken EU defence policy, something needs 
to be proposed to fill the gap left by the UK. The fact that US President 
Donald Trump appears less committed to the Western Alliance means 
that the development of a more robust European defence policy seems 
more important than before. German leader Angela Merkel seems fully 
to have grasped this fact, when announcing at the end of the G7 Meeting 
in late May 2017 that the EU will need to take charge of its own defence 
(Politico 2017).
Even if these integrative initiatives go ahead, the EU cannot sim-
ply return to a business- as- usual approach to integration, but must learn 
from the experience of Brexit and other EU crises. The March 2017 
Commission White Paper on the Future of Europe indicates that there are 
some important decisions to be made. Without considerable resources 
(competences, funds) at the EU level, the EU cannot be everything to 
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everyone. While it is a system that is based on the rule of law and a large 
acquis communautaire, the EU is struggling with various Member States 
that do not always respect the founding principles of the EU. Moreover, 
the protest votes witnessed in the 2016 Italian referendum, as well as 
the lessons learnt from Brexit and the election of Trump, indicate that 
citizens are disgruntled with the way globalisation has treated them 
(Blockmans & Weiss 2016, 3).
Yet, with national elections in Western Europe in late 2016 and 
spring 2017 (Austria, the Netherlands and France) having generated 
more pro- EU than anti- EU populist leaders, there may be more scope 
for unity among Member State leaders in the coming months and 
years. Having had a chance to vote explicitly with European integra-
tion in mind, and with more clarity after the UK referendum about the 
challenges involved in being outside the EU (Financial Times 2017a), 
there might even be more support from European citizens for deeper 
European integration. Yet the EU is well advised to ensure that with any 
deepening comes some sort of increase in democratic accountability to 
its citizens.
Conclusions
Brexit is one of several crises to have hit the EU in recent years. The 
implications of Brexit on European integration are, therefore, also 
the consequences of those other crises. We view crises as windows 
of opportunity and sources of motivation for actors who take advan-
tage of instability and uncertainty to push particular agendas. Those 
agendas are not necessarily pro- integration, in the sense of uncon-
ditional transfer of national powers to supranational institutions 
(supra national integration), but they are associated with EU- level 
reform. They may, as such, seek to push European integration in a 
non- supranational direction, by promoting new forms of intergovern-
mentalism, by institutionalising a multi- speed, differentiated model 
of European cooperation (Cini & Pérez- Solórzano 2016), or by further 
enhancing mechanisms that advance coordination and fine- tuning, as 
has been the case with social policy coordination (Verdun & Wood 
2013). In his contribution to the Brexit debate, Ferrera (2017) for exam-
ple makes the case for the establishment of a European Social Union, 
one that is ‘capable of combining domestic and pan- European solidari-
ties’. Alternatively, other agendas pushed by actors in times of crisis 
may seek to promote disintegration. Actors working for the collapse 
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of the EU and a return to exclusively national, or even nationalist, 
politics will also see crises as an opportunity for them to push their 
own vision of the future. It remains to be seen which of these com-
peting agendas will be successful. There are no clear indicators as to 
which agenda will win, as there is no mechanism that will at all times 
push forward the pro- cooperation agenda. But the political winds that 
are blowing through the EU27 seem to have produced fertile soil for 
another attempt at deepening integration. Provided that both the EU 
and national leaders remain committed to European integration, the 
event of Brexit may very well mark another bout of centripetal activity, 
bringing the remaining EU Member States closer together.
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